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This article explores the social mechanisms that lead to the emergence of suicide attacks in new 
theatres, as well as factors influencing the frequency of such suicide attacks, by studying one of 
the states in which suicide attacks have most recently occurred – Somalia. The article argues that 
a suicide attack in the Somali setting seems to be a well-planned reaction to diplomatic or 
military moves by opposing parties in the conflict. However, it also poses that the initial 
emergence of suicide attacks in Somalia is grounded in ideological elements new to Somalia. 
The article thus argues that while frequency variations in suicide attacks are best understood as 
the result of rational calculations within an organisation, ideological elements and organisational 
belief systems have to be explored in order to understand the initial adoption of suicide attacks in 
Somalia. 
Introduction
In early March 2007, Adam Salad Adam started work as a salesman, selling watches, clothes and 
electronics to Ethiopians and Somalis in the vicinity of Tarbuunka in Mogadishu, Somalia. On 26 
March, he drove his Toyota through the first checkpoint guarding a local Ethiopian base. Adam 
Salad Adam’s car was loaded with explosives; his plan was to detonate the charges as close as 
possible to the Ethiopian military base. He did not intend to escape from the explosion. He was a 
suicide bomber, part of a relatively new phenomenon in Somalia. 
When the car exploded at the gate of the base, close to the cantina of the Ethiopians, 63 
Ethiopian soldiers died and 50 were wounded. The 26 March attack was the first Somali suicide 
bombing that was filmed, a film that was later posted on the Internet. It signalled a new trend in 
Somalia. Before 2006, there had been no recorded suicide attacks in Somali history; from 2006 
to February 2010 (when this article was written), there were 20 confirmed suicide attacks, as 
well as several other alleged cases. Sub-Saharan Africa, for the first time, witnessed a theatre 
with the systematic and prolonged use of suicide bombings. The Somali case is part of a global 
pattern. In the last ten years, suicide attacks were adopted for the first time in Afghanistan (9 
September 2001), in Chechnya (7 June 2000) and in Iraq (26 February 2003).[1] Bruce Hoffman 
has found that 80 per cent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after 11 September 2001.[2] 
There have been many attempts to explain the phenomenon of suicide bombing. One approach is 
to focus on individual suicide bombers and their ostensible psychological or economic problems. 
However, the consistency of social and/or psychological problems amongst suicide bombers 
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varies from case to case – being absent in the Sri Lankan, Iraqi, Pakistani and Palestinian cases 
but present in the Chechnya and Afghanistan cases.[3] It is important to note that the focus on 
individual psychological/economic/social factors fails to explain longer suicide campaigns. In 
order to sustain a long-term suicide campaign, several individuals have to be involved. Suicide 
attacks are thus a group phenomenon rather than an individual phenomenon, and in most suicide 
attacks there are organisations involved.[4] Systematic recruitment efforts, experienced planners 
and logistics are important factors in the execution of any sustained organisational effort, 
including that of suicide attacks.[5] Suicide attacks can be viewed as a specific type of tactic 
employed in order to achieve a specific goal, as the result of a planning process, and as a tool 
comparable to other strategies in asymmetric warfare such as guerilla attacks or remote-
controlled bombs. The suicide bomber thus becomes the low-cost equivalent of a cruise missile – 
able to seek out weak points in the defences of the enemy, and, in disguise, even with a potential 
stealth capacity. Applying suicide attacks may thus be seen as the result of learning from the 
successes of such strategies in other conflicts. In fact, in his book “Dying to Win”, Robert A Pape 
focuses on learning from the successes of suicide tactics as one of the major factors that prompt 
an organisation to adopt suicide terrorism.[6] Pape focuses on suicide attacks as an 
organisational phenomenon, and his approach examines the adoption of suicide tactics as a 
reflection of rational cost-benefit calculations on the part of strategic decision makers. However, 
Pape’s claims have been strongly criticised. Assaf Moghadam shows that only four out of 17 
suicide terrorist campaigns have led to a successful outcome.[7] Similarly, Brym and Arj show 
that Palestinian groups implemented suicide strategies despite clear knowledge that these 
strategies had few positive political effects.[8] Their critique is timely but may overlook the 
tactical gains that suicide strategies can achieve and the smaller local rewards that improve the 
standing of the implementing organisation. A conflict does not need to be won through suicide 
attacks in order for a suicide strategy to be applied so as to gain advantage over an enemy or a 
rival. Suicide attacks provide valuable media exposure to groups in asymmetric conflict 
situations, drawing local and possibly global attention to their grievances, and creating a low-
cost and sustainable environment of insecurity that can force the opposition to the negotiating 
table.[9] When applied in a state-building context, suicide bombing also attracts attention to the 
failures of the state- builders.[10] Suicide attacks can also, in the right circumstances, be a 
method of generating grass-roots support for an insurgency. The use of suicide attacks becomes a 
demonstration of ideological commitment, as the act itself demonstrates a willingness to make a 
total sacrifice for a cause.[11] It may also be a good alternative for hitting hardened and well-
protected targets that would anyway have created casualties for the attacker. [12] Suicide attacks 
thus provide recruitment advantages for an organisation against other rivals’ armed factions that 
are fighting the same enemy. This is the essence of Mia Bloom’s so-called out-biding thesis, 
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which views suicide attacks as a recruitment strategy in the competition with other groups 
fighting a similar enemy.[13] 
Why so few suicide bombers?
According to the line of argumentation above, the initial adoption of suicide attacks and the 
frequency of such attacks should correlate with a belief that some form of organisational reward 
(in this life), either politically or tactically, is estimated by the challenger to be sufficient to 
justify the costs of suicide bombing – namely the deaths of the suicide bombers and potential 
hostility towards the strategy owing to local and international antipathy. These explanations see 
suicide attacks as the result of a rational calculation process, where the initial adoption becomes 
a result of learning, of seeing examples of its successful adoption both locally and 
internationally, and of employing suicide attack as a form of military tactic, employed to gain 
advantage at a tactical level against an enemy or popularity in the face of rivals. Frequencies of 
suicide attacks should thus increase when such strategies are needed and when organisations are 
facing hardship, trying to establish themselves in new areas or trying to gain attention. 
Why then do not all organisations employ suicide attacks when they can gain from it? Firstly, the 
high human cost may limit the application of suicide bombing strategies to desperate situations. 
Ami Pedahzur, Stephen Hopgood and Berman and Latin, for example, see suicide attacks as a 
strategy in asymmetric warfare, in which one party is superior to another party. Suicide attacks 
then become the desperate strategy of a weak opponent challenging a stronger enemy.[14] Yet 
factions in Somalia have fought asymmetric battles without resorting to suicide attacks, being 
defeated and destroyed. In their “Club model”, Berman and Latin also suggest that organisations 
that have high entry costs for members, and thus have very committed members, are the most 
common employers of suicide attacks. However, this overlooks the high entry costs and high 
commitment of several insurgent organisations that nevertheless have not led to the application 
of suicide attacks.[15] 
Another approach argues that suicide attacks are more a question of revenge. Pedahzur claims 
that counter-terrorism strategies actually influence the decision to apply suicide attacks. 
Collective punishment and large-scale killings create an environment where suicide action 
becomes more accepted.[16] Barry Weingast and Rui de Figueiredo’s argument is that violence 
tends to follow a retaliatory pattern, resulting in cycles of violence.[17] Robert J. Brym and 
Bader Araj stress the importance of the counter strategies; they claim that extreme 
countermeasures, such as assassinations and the use of heavy artillery, lead to an increase in 
suicide attacks.[18] Araj also points out that suicide attacks can be used as a form of revenge, a 
way to punish an opposing enemy for atrocities.[19] He illustrates this point by showing how, by 
2006, Palestinians were already aware of the fact that suicide attacks increased extremism and 
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determination in Israel, yet nevertheless they supported suicide attacks.[20] Such an approach 
seems related to a psychosocial approach, exploring collective traumas. Evelin Lindner claims 
that collective/group humiliation, the feeling that ‘our’ societies are worse off than our enemies’, 
mixed with historical entrepreneurs playing on these feelings, may create terrorism, including 
suicide terrorism.[21] Her view was that collective experiences may create fertile ground for 
suicide strategies; therefore, a humiliating invasion and a high frequency of war traumas become 
factors that could act as motivators for group actions. Luca Ricolfi sees collective humiliation 
such as this as a factor for increasing recruitment, making suicide missions easier to conduct, and 
enabling other motives to operate, for example the need for fame. The humiliation would make 
the general population more appreciative of the act of the suicide bomber, thus ensuring that a 
suicide bomber wanting fame and sympathy would get this.[22] One of Robert Pape’s arguments 
may seem to run parallel with this type of argument, as he maintains that suicide attacks are the 
result of occupation, that they are a form of resistance against an invader. However, there are 
frequent experiences of violence, humiliation and dreadful collective experiences around the 
world, and perhaps particularly so in the case of Somalia and the general region of the Horn of 
Africa, that do not lead to any form of suicide attack, even though some of them pit a Christian 
occupying power/invader against Muslims; there must be other mechanisms at work as well.[23]
Perhaps religion or culture could be such mechanisms? [24] Mia Bloom argues that community 
acceptance (or rejection), often influenced by elements within the local culture, is essential in 
determining both the initial adoption and the frequency of suicide attacks.[25] Another purported 
explanation focuses on the religious rationality behind suicide attacks. David Bukay, for 
example, argues that suicide bombing is created by religious beliefs. Bukay claims that Islam in 
particular has a clear theological foundation for suicide attacks, and that this foundation is a vital 
factor in explaining why suicide attacks occur.[26] Stephen Dale’s argument runs parallel to 
Bukay’s, suggesting that cultural traits of resistance activated when Islam faces occupation 
powers create suicide bombing, rather than traits of Islam per se.[27] However, any explanation 
focusing on the general traits or culture of Islam, or even Islamic resistance to invasions, is 
highly problematic, particularly in the Somali case. Somalis have been fighting several wars with 
neighbouring Christian-dominated Ethiopia since the sixteenth century, yet suicide attacks only 
occurred in 2006. Given that Somalia is overwhelmingly a Muslim country, and that suicide 
attacks are a relatively new occurrence despite a lengthy period of civil war, explanations that 
highlight Islam as a causal factor seem to be misleading, even when ostensibly Christian nations 
have engaged in Somalia before, such as the United States (1993-1994), and Ethiopia’s, albeit 
short, interventions (1996, 1998).
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Another possible approach is to limit the scope more and to examine specific ideologies within 
Islam. Salafism, or Salafi jihadism, has been blamed for the spread of suicide bombings.[28] 
Such an approach also encounters large problems. As Sheik Khalil Ameer from the former 
Eritrean Islamic Jihad and Sheik Ali Gawish of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood express it, 
mixing elements from Salafism with other types of Islam is relatively common, and some groups 
will retain some elements from mainstream Salafism while discarding others.[29] Salafists are 
far from a homogeneous group; the term itself is broad and vague and can be misleading and 
overly broad when applied to politics and ideological studies. Even when Salafi jihadism is 
defined narrowly, it encounters problems. As Thomas Hegghammer points out, there were few 
Salafi jihadist groups that carried out suicide attacks before 2000, so Salafi jihadism in itself fails 
to offer a satisfying explanation for suicide attacks.[30] A more specific approach may perhaps 
be needed. Such an approach may avoid the trap of generalising about vague concepts such as 
religion or culture, while at the same time maintaining the focus on elements within a religious/
ideological belief system held by a particular organization, or at least powerful elements within 
them. Such ideational elements could be common to some organisations rather than to a religion 
as such, and could be traits that even secular organisations may internalise. Diego Gambetta, for 
example, focuses on shaheedness, a destructive martyrdom, martyrdom in war rather than in 
peace. Farhad Khosrokhavar similarly emphasises “offensive martyrdom” which is employed 
against heretics and non-believers, while Muhamed M. Hafez emphasises “the culture of 
martyrdom” as a result of victimisation and the active self-reinforcing of organisational rites. 
However, a case study of Somalia may give us the opportunity to delve deeper into the belief 
systems of specific organisations, as well as sub-groups within them, and to identify more such 
elements.[31]
It is important to note that rationality-focused explanations do not necessarily contradict a focus 
on components of organisational belief systems, as suggested by Elisabeth Kier, as such elements 
may define strategies or targets that are incorporated into a rational calculating process. Nor do 
rationality-focused arguments necessarily contradict a humiliation hypothesis, humiliation 
simply defining the goals of a rational actor.[32] This article claims that, in the Somali case, 
suicide bombings have followed a pattern that indicates a rational organisation strategy that is 
designed to face new challenges; it is a type of tactic chosen because of the benefits it has 
brought the organisation. Nonetheless, the third section of the article will claim that a benefit-
focused hypothesis alone fails to explain the initial adoption of suicide attacks. The article argues 
that to understand the initial emergence of suicide terrorism in Somalia, it is necessary to explore 
the set of beliefs held by powerful elements of the Harakat Al Shebab group, who are the 
primary, if not the only, agent of suicide attacks inside Somalia. This is explored not by 
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employing a broad concept such as Salafi jihadism or Islam, but rather by analysing the specific 
elements that separate the Shebab from other groups in the Somali setting. 
The structure of the Somali suicide attacks
Although Somalis may have been involved in suicide attacks outside of Somalia before 2006, the 
first alleged suicide attack within Somalia took place on 18 September that year.[33] The attack 
targeted a convoy with the then-president of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), 
Abdullahi Yusuf. The attack took place in confusing circumstances, and no person or 
organisation took responsibility, as the TFG had a strong interest in convincing the global media 
that it was a suicide attack by radicals with connections outside Somalia because of a need to 
gain Western support for their struggle against their then-rivals, the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Courts (SCIC) in Mogadishu. Nevertheless, the next attack was confirmed by independent 
sources and was claimed by a group, and fits into a pattern when compared with later attacks: on 
30 November 2006, an Ethiopian control post on a road leading into Baidoa (at Daynuunaay) 
was targeted by a suicide bomber.[34] A local commander of the Al Bayan Sharia court – 
formally part of the alliance of Sharia courts, the SCIC – Mohamed Ibrahim Said Bilal, claimed 
responsibility for the attack. Bilal’s declaration of responsibility seemed to contradict his 
supposed superiors within the SCIC, and the latter publicly distanced themselves from the attack.
[35] Bilal’s special connections with more radical Afghanistan veterans within the SCIC may 
explain this difference of opinion, as he was at the time (through the Al Bayan court) working for 
Afghanistan veteran Muqtar Robow “Abu Mansoor”, who later became one of the leaders of the 
Somali radical Al Shebab organisation.[36] Al Shebab has since become the foremost agent of 
suicide attacks in Somalia, indeed no other group has ever publicly acknowledged responsibility 
for suicide attacks.[37] This first confirmed attack illustrates how suicide attacks in Somalia 
were launched by a group of radicals within the Sharia courts rather than by the Sharia courts 
themselves. It also illustrates how the Sharia courts distanced themselves from the suicide 
attacks, even those against ostensibly Christian Ethiopia. In fact, it seemed as though the courts 
did not need to use suicide bombs, that there was a balance of power between the belligerents, 
and many believed that the Ethiopians would be defeated.[38] While Somalia’s first suicide 
attack came in this period, the frequency compared with later periods was low, there being only 
one confirmed, and one possible attack in the whole of 2006.
In December 2006, local clashes escalated into outright war between the SCIC and the TFG 
supported by Ethiopia. The SCIC was rapidly defeated in a humiliating campaign. By the end of 
January 2007, the SCIC’s institution was shattered and its members were on the run; the TFG 
and its Ethiopian allies asserted control over central and southern Somalia but refrained from 
occupying parts of the capital, Mogadishu. The start of Somalia’s first wave of suicide attacks 
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coincided with a large Ethiopian offensive to conquer parts of Mogadishu, an offensive that 
started in March 2007.[39] In the period from March to April, fighting was intensive in 
Mogadishu.[40] The impact of the fighting on the civilian population was devastating:[41] by 
late April, the UN estimated that at least 365,000 people had fled the city.[42] 
At the time, Al Shebab was one of many insurgency groups and was in the process of 
reestablishing itself after its collapse in late December 2006. Before its use of suicide attacks, Al 
Shebab was by and large ignored by the media, although this changed as suicide attacks became 
more frequent. Suicide attacks targeted Ethiopian bases and led to a large number of casualties ; 
thus they had a purely military value. The suicide wave also occurred simultaneously with the 
defeat of the insurgents; they were attacked and humiliated by superior forces, and were clearly 
outmatched.[43] The attacks could thus be the result of a wish for revenge because of a collective 
humiliation due to the Ethiopian intervention/invasion; indeed Adam Salad Adam’s suicide video 
depicted his attack as a revenge tactic for a rape conducted by Ethiopian forces.[44] The Somali 
pattern of suicide attacks before 2007 do not indicate this. Firstly, although Ethiopia had 
intervened regularly during the years 1996-1998, this did not result in suicide attacks, even from 
Somali Islamist organisations, although Ethiopians severely crushed their bases. Not even during 
the larger Ethiopian-Somali Ogadeen war in 1977-78, taking place in Somali-inhabited lands, did 
suicide attacks occur. Secondly, although Ethiopia had had a military presence in areas of 
Somalia since spring 2006, only the two previously-mentioned suicide attacks (of which one 
seems to have been a bomb-attack rather than a suicide attack) were registered between 
September 2006 and March 2007.  It could be argued that it was the general suffering of the 
Mogadishu population during the March-April offensive in 2007 that prompted the suicide wave, 
given that the campaign took place in densely-populated Mogadishu. However, the Mogadishu 
population had suffered before the March-April offensive, such as during the UNISOM II 
intervention in 1993-1994 (which at the time bin Laden argued was a Christian invasion) and the 
so-called Four Month War in 1991, and no suicide attacks occurred during these periods. Even in 
2006, only one organisation, the Harakat Al Shebab, implemented the suicide attacks; thus 
humiliation must have influenced other insurgent groups differently.[45]
From the end of May 2007, suicide attacks continued even after the Ethiopian withdrawal from 
Mogadishu and Somalia in 2009. Ethiopian presence was still felt in Somalia through fast raids 
and through support for Ethiopian allies. However, Ethiopian operations after 2009 were similar 
to Ethiopia’s frequent interventions in 1995-2006, rapid raids rather than occupation, support for 
allies rather than commitment men of forces. Although Ethiopian forces deployed on short-term 
missions in Somalia before 2006 had provoked anger, they never provoked suicide missions, but 
after the 2009 withdrawal suicide missions continued. Suicide missions also took place during 
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periods without intensive fighting. The suicide attacks seem rather to be correlated with the 
Shebab’s need to gain attention, to establish itself in new areas or to damage peace and state-
building processes. Once the March-April offensive ended, which was a humiliating experience 
for Shebab, the Ethiopians and their Somali allies won in Mogadishu, the rate of suicide 
bombings decreased and remained low until October 2008. This decline is best explained by the 
tactical situation on the ground. During the summer of 2007, Al Shebab was reorganising, was 
gaining attention on both the Somali and the international stage, and was adjusting to using 
guerrilla tactics in its operations. At this time, all rebel groups abstained from holding territories 
and resorted to hit-and-run attacks, which made them less vulnerable to large-scale TFG/
Ethiopian offensives, but they were expanding the geographical and operational scope of their 
attacks. Although the humiliating experience of the Ethiopian presence in Mogadishu remained, 
there was no desperate need to stop large TFG/Ethiopian offensives and no need to gain 
attention. The Shebab was on the offensive both in the media and militarily.
The first suicide attack after the summer of 2007 was the 11 October 2007 suicide attack targeted 
at the TFG prime minister in Baidoa, hitting a factory close to his hotel. It was the only suicide 
attack during the autumn of 2007, and it coincided with the Harakat Al Shebab establishing a 
military presence in the region, apparently drawing attention to Al Shebab when it was 
organising itself in a new area.[46] Following the October 2007 attack, only one attack took 
place over the next year. Suicide strategies were not needed, and other strategies served the aims 
of the Harakat Al Shebab perfectly. 
However, during the summer of 2008, the TFG started negotiating with a powerful and popular 
faction (as it was then perceived) of the opposition in Djibouti. At first these negotiations were 
cumbersome and few believed that they could succeed, but by the autumn of 2008 the talks 
produced tangible results. On 26 October 2008, the two parties in the Djibouti process – the 
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, Djibouti group (ARS-D) and the TFG – announced a 
ceasefire.[47] At the time, the agreement was popular within Somalia and was supported by the 
United States as well as by several of the veteran Islamists within the old SCIC. The mood 
amongst diplomats in Nairobi was frantically positive. As the focus shifted onto the Djibouti 
process, the insurgents lost media attention and were threatened politically and militarily; even 
worse, increased military deployments from the African Union and United Nation forces were 
seriously discussed. The insurgents’ response was swift: the Shebab attacked the city of Merka. 
Almost simultaneously, a suicide video of Abdulaziz Bashar Abdullahi’s attack against the 
African Union forces in April 2008 was released. Then Somalia’s largest and most well-
coordinated wave of suicide attacks began on 29 October 2008.[48] The wave of attacks 
succeeded in shifting attention away from the diplomatic triumphs of the new negotiation 
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process and back to the insurgency, and contributed to the deterrence of the potential UN and AU 
peacekeeping contingents for Somalia which were discussed within the United Nations and the 
African Union.[49]
The Djibouti peace process was not derailed by the 29 October attacks, and once the Ethiopians 
withdrew from Somalia in January 2009, Mogadishu became more peaceful until May 2009. 
However, despite this, suicide attacks within Somalia increased. On 24 February, an alleged 
suicide bomber exploded when Somali police opened fire on a suspicious car in Mogadishu. On 
21 February 2009, two suicide bombers – one suicide car-bomber and one bomber using an 
explosive vest – attacked the forces of the African Union in Mogadishu.[50] Both the new 
transitional government, led by former SCIC leader Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Sharif, which was 
then popular both within Somalia and amongst the Diaspora but which is now in decline, and the 
fact that this transitional government was supported both by the West and by notable Islamists 
such as Yusuf Qaradawi, presented an increasing threat to the Shebab, drawing attention away 
from it. It is important to note that if the Ethiopian presence in Somalia caused the suicide 
bombing, its withdrawal from all of its permanent bases would be expected to lead to a decline, 
but it did not. As the Ethiopians withdrew, the numbers of attacks remained constant. The June 
18 2009 attack by suicide bomber Muxamed Deerow Shiikh Aadam (zubayr) targeting the new 
government’s head of security Omar Hashi Aden on 18 June 2009 – seems to have been 
thoroughly planned and caused chaos in the government’s security apparatus, paving the way for 
the Shebab’s tactical victories during the summer of 2009. In fact, suicide attacks in Somalia 
seem to have been thoroughly planned as part of an organisational strategy to balance the odds 
and to gain attention, and they have been highly effective. Suicide bombing seems to be guided 
by a rational process, in which the targets and the timing are carefully selected to achieve the 
political and strategic aims of the Harakat Al Shebab. While suicide bombing has not succeeded 
in bringing large strategic victories to these groups, it has succeeded in bringing them media 
attention and has contributed to a general environment of insecurity that can be used for 
propaganda purposes. 
The initial humiliation of the Ethiopian intervention does not explain the pattern of the suicide 
attacks nor does the humiliation of the Mogadishu offensive during the spring of 2007. Suicide 
attacks took place even after Ethiopia had withdrawn most of their forces from Somali territory, 
in a period where the Ethiopian raids were very similar to past Ethiopian presence in Somalia 
during the civil war (which never led to suicide attacks), and during periods of relative peace. 
Political and military challenges facing the Shebab are better predictors of suicide attacks. For 
the Harakat Al Shebab, the main initiator of suicide attacks, it seems that suicide strategies 
remain a specific tool in their military and political campaigns, a tool comparable to guerilla 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	   	   	   	   	   Volume	  1,	  Issue	  1
23	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   January	  	  2011
attacks, ambushes, and remote-controlled bombs. However, the above discussion does not 
explain why a suicide bomber strategy has not been adopted by other factions in Somalia, and 
why Al Shebab and not other factions have implemented the majority of the attacks.
Why was suicide bombing adopted? 
Bruce Hoffman has found that 80 per cent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after the 
September 11 attacks.[51] It seems as though the attention caused by the September 11 suicide 
bombing contributed to an increased interest in the strategy around the world, and Somalia is part  
of this pattern. Such an argument presents us with a riddle: if this interest was general, why did 
only one organisation in Somalia, the Harakat Al Shebab, publicly claim to use the strategy?[52] 
No other Somali organisation to date has ever published suicide videos or claimed responsibility 
for suicide attacks, and it is doubtful that any other organisation has attempted to use suicide 
tactics.[53] Other rival insurgent groups have been in desperate situations that could have 
justified suicide tactics, but they have nevertheless publicly refrained from using such tactics.
[54] One reason for the lack of suicide bombings conducted by other organisations in Somalia is 
what Mia Bloom refers to as community rejection. Somali society has no tradition of suicide 
bombings, and to a certain extent the suicide tactic is alien to Somali culture – there has been no 
tradition of using suicide attacks in conflicts. There was no recorded suicide bombing in Somalia 
before 2006, and there is simply no historical tradition of suicide attacks.[55] In fact the Somali 
clan system to a certain extent discourages suicide bombings, as clans are seen as collectively 
responsible for the actions of individuals and suicide attacks could lead to retribution against a 
person's clan. The past fluidity of the Somali civil war, and its lack of ideology, and rather a 
focus on profit seeking also discouraged suicide missions. Many observers stated it was the 
Ethiopian intervention (occupation) that created suicide attacks.[56] However, previous 
interventions, which were shorter but in which Ethiopians took more direct control of land,  and 
when the American-led AMISOM II or UNITAF more directly intervened or took control of 
large parts of Mogadishu, did not result in suicide attacks.  Nor did Ethiopia's alleged occupation 
of the Somali-inhabited Ogadeen region, and various military campaigns this region, some with 
severe consequences and violations of human rights, result in suicide bombings. Moreover, only 
one out of many insurgent organisations, including other Islamist organisations, implemented 
suicide missions, even in the period of Ethiopian occupation 2006-2009. The most likely 
explanation for this is that the Islamist organisations that existed in previous periods, and other 
Islamist organisations active in Mogadishu 2006-2009, were different from the organisation 
implementing suicide attacks in Somalia in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and today, namely the 
Shebab. In fact, the development of suicide attacks to a certain extent follows the development of 
one single organisation, the Harakat Al Shebab, which until 2006 was a loose, informal network 
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but by 2007 was growing into a separate organisation.[57] In the end, the suicide tactic was only 
publicly adopted by the Shebab or Shebab affiliates, and began as the group consolidated into an 
organisation. 
The Shebab organisation originally consisted of a core group, of which many had a background 
from Afghanistan; it was ideologically strong enough to transcend clan from an early stage. Two 
of these members were found guilty in Somaliland courts for attacks against Westerners as early 
as in 2003 and 2004. The attacks were not motivated by profit but rather by hostility towards the 
West, and not taking place in a combat situation, something new in Somalia at the time, it also 
took the risk of replacing the Somali flag with a black jihadi flag during the fighting over 
Kismayo in 2006, claiming that the former represented secular borders, creating tension between 
them and the more nationalistic elements within the Sharia courts. However, the success of the 
group meant that other elements were recruited: profit seekers, local militia that wanted to be on 
the winning side, as well as Diaspora motivated sometimes by nationalistic, sometimes by 
clanish reasons. Nevertheless, elements of the original core group remained important, if not 
dominating, within the organisation. Moreover, they dominated the training of new recruits, both 
international and Somali, in the core areas controlled by the organisation.[58] The worldviews of 
the old core group of Shebabs remained important, and the qualities of ideologies adopted by 
powerful elements of the organisation were very different from all other Somali factions. At least 
three ideological traits separated these elements from most of Somalia’s political actors. The first 
trait was the organisation’s use of special pan-Islamist and jihadist rhetoric, in some instances 
closely resembling the rhetoric of Al Qaeda, always tending towards praise when that 
organisation was mentioned while denying being a part of it. In the words of the old Shebab head 
of public relations Muktar Robow, “That is all there is to it. We are not part of them (Al Qaeda) 
but we love them very much.”[59] Ideologically, the Shebab leaders often declared the need to 
resurrect the pan-Islamic caliphate, putting their local conflict in a global framework of good 
versus evil. In this sense, the enemy was not only Ethiopia but also the West.[60] In many ways, 
their rhetoric strongly echoed Farhad Khosrokhavar’s focus on the transnationalism of some of 
the modern martyrs, namely Al Qaeda’s focus on the Global Ummah.[61]
The second trait separating the Shebab from other Somali organisations was their anti-nationalist 
rhetoric, as well as their critique of traditional Islamic groups in Somalia such as the Sufis. 
Admittedly, Shebab probably recruited from youth hostile to the Ethiopian intervention and with 
a nationalist motivation for joining, even using implicit nationalistic like references to Ethiopian 
occupation in some of their videos,  but the rhetoric of the leadership was to a certain extent 
surprisingly anti-nationalist, revolutionary in a Somali setting where most fractions publically 
have claimed their allegiance to the Somali nation (although often functioning as mere clan 
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fronts).[62] Most of the known Shebab top leaders have made strong anti-nationalist statements. 
Former spokesperson Muktar Robow is perhaps the Shebab leader who most clearly defined the 
Shebab’s attitude towards nationalism and patriotism, stating that “a nationalistic, patriotic bond 
is against the (Muslim) brotherhood bond”, as well as criticising the organisation for replacing 
the jihad with “patriotic resistance”.[63] Shebab leaders strongly and explicitly distanced 
themselves totally from the nationalist agenda.[64] Symbolically, the Shebab even refused/
refuses to use the Somali flag, tearing it down wherever possible. In this sense the Shebab, or at 
least most of the Shebab leaders, depict themselves as sharing ideology and motivation with 
other radical organisations with similar goals; and with four out of the eight leaders in the Shura 
council in 2007 with a background from Afghanistan, this seemed natural.[65] 
The third trait also seems to have been borrowed from Al Qaeda – death worshipping, best 
illustrated by Abu Mansoor’s remark 
 Our brother Ma'alin and our brother Umar Dheere alias Abu Jabal. Many of those who 
 were present during the formation of the group have also been martyred. Those who are 
 still alive are also looking forward to death, in order to die for the same cause that 
 others before them died for.[66]
Shebab ideology, much more refined than its Somali predecessors, also provided stronger 
justifications for suicide attacks. Admittedly, there have been rifts even within the old core group 
of Shebabs – for example, between former press spokesman Muktar Robow and leader Abu 
Zubeir – but both parties, even the supposedly more moderate Muktar Robow, adhered to the 
elements described above, both in statements in the Somali press or on international jihadist 
websites and in interviews; and the two parties also seem to have become reconciled during the 
summer of 2009.[67] These three traits were important throughout the Shebab’s organisational 
history and remain so today.
Shebab leaders were thus the only Somali leaders that publicly and repeatedly praised Al Qaeda. 
They framed their struggle in a global context; this approach deviated from all mainstream and 
traditional religious views in Somalia.[68] This indicated a willingness to adopt ideology from 
organisations with similar views and also indicated admiration for Al Qaeda, a major 
implementer of suicide attacks. In fact, it was almost natural that Shebab in the end borrowed the 
suicide strategy, amongst other elements, from Al Qaeda. 
The above line of argumentation supports Thomas Hegghammer’s view that elements within 
specific ideologies need to be explored rather than abstract notions such as Islam, culture or 
Salafism. Any attempt to explain the adoption of suicide bombing in Somalia that focuses on 
Somali or Islamic culture or religion can be misleading. Somalia and Islam have been tied 
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together for centuries during which there were no suicide attacks. Indeed, even today there are 
many Islamist organisations fighting alongside Al Shebab, but no known Somali Islamist 
organisation other than the Shebab implementing suicide tactics. An examination exploring the 
differences between the Shebab and the other Somali actors seems to indicate relatively large 
variations in ideology, and to show that there are certain tenets of some of the most powerful 
Shebab leaders that are alien to Somali society in general, but that are shared by other global 
jihadi actors. Rather than talking about an abstract notion of Somali culture or about religion per 
se, it may be more fruitful to talk about a specific belief system or a combination of more 
specific ideological elements. The most important point is that the Shebab’s ideological traits 
contain indications that powerful elements within the organisation adopted ideological tenets 
from other organisations implementing suicide attacks – both indicating a willingness to learn 
from these organisations, in particular Al Qaeda, as well as providing justification for the use of 
suicide attacks. The fact that only the Shebab adopted suicide tactics seems to indicate that their 
openness to Al Qaeda’s ideology, and the ideological elements borrowed from them justifying 
suicide attacks, are important in understanding their initial willingness to use suicide attack. In 
fact, the Al Qaeda-inspired ideological elements are what make the organisation stand out in the 
Somali political context.[69] 
The situation in 2006-2007 created a window of opportunity for the special elements of Shebab 
ideology as well as for the Shebab itself. Similarly, the Iraq crisis had an impact in Somalia, and 
hostility towards the West increased.[70] In this sense, humiliation did play a role but only 
because of the ideological elements that allowed it to have an influence, and it had little 
influence on the variations in the frequency of suicide bombings. Statements by the leaders of the 
organisation indicate elements of a very specific belief system that were used to justify the use of 
suicide attacks, and that indicated a willingness to learn from external organisations sharing these 
elements. In examining suicide attacks, it may be fruitful to explore specific belief systems and 
shared perceptions of the world within smaller groups, rather than for example exploring whole 
religions; to study more detailed elements rather than to generalise about a religion or even larger 
sub-groups within that religion.
Pape’s claims regarding suicide tactics as a form of resistance to physical occupation are 
misleading, as it is not occupation per se that creates suicide attacks. It is perhaps a specific 
element of ideology that enables not only occupation but also perceived humiliation – such as the 
Danish cartoon incident frequently depicted in Shebab suicide videos – to have an impact; it may 
be a depiction of a world of eternal struggle between an imagined community, the Umma, and 
everyone else, rather than national resistance to Ethiopian intervention. 
Conclusion
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The main finding of this article is that the frequency of suicide bombings in Somalia varies 
according to the strategic needs of the Al Shebab organisation, indicating that the use of suicide 
bombing is a product of strategic reasoning. Suicide bombing is thus the result of a strategic 
cost-benefit calculation, wherein groups use this suicide tactic to gain attention, to gain political 
advantage and, in a few cases, to gain military advantage. Only in one period of suicide attacks 
in Somalia, between March and April 2007, does the traumatisation hypothesis have explanatory 
power; but even within this period, Al Shebab’s strategic needs provide a good alternative 
explanation. This suggests that a view that focuses on the organisation implementing suicide 
attacks in order to increase its own power explains variations in the frequency of the tactic’s 
adoption in Somalia.
However, a focus on organisational needs and rewards does not fully explain the initial adoption 
of suicide bombings in Somalia. Other Somali organisations could have adopted suicide attacks 
as a tactic but chose not to. The Shebab differed from these organisations in several of the 
ideological traits which its leadership claims to adhere to. An approach focusing on 
organisational rewards or organisational suicide tactics is not enough to understand suicide 
bombings in Somalia. Ideological elements, creating a belief system that provides some form of 
justification for suicide tactics alien to Somali culture, had to be in place to enable suicide 
bombing to take root. This suggests that a study of organisational beliefs, also the beliefs of 
organisational sub-groups, in general can be fertile when attempting to explore the organisations 
that will respond to organisational needs by adopting suicide attacks. The findings suggest that 
suicide bombings may fruitfully be approached through a combined rational actor/belief system-
based model. In the Somali case, this offers some hope as the organisation that so far has 
claimed responsibility for most suicide attacks in Somalia, the Shebab, has drastically expanded 
its new membership. With a possible shift in the ideological orientation of the Shebab, the 
organisation may evolve and become less willing to use suicide attacks.
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Appendix 1: Suicide attacks in Somalia January 2006-April 2010
Date Target Confirmed as a suicide 












Car convoy with 
Somali President 
Yusuf in Baidoa
No, several sources 
describe it as an ambush 
only.




Somali road block 
outside Baidoa
Yes Mohamed Ibrahim Said 
Bilal, militia 
commander, Al Bayan 
court claim 
responsibility, Bilal 











Ethiopian base in 
Mogadishu




Ethiopian base in 
Mogadishu





Ethiopian base in 
Afgoye






No, only one source says 
it was a suicide attack, 
other sources claim it was 
a bomb.





No, AU is not sure if it 
was a suicide attack or 
not. The attack was 
conducted with a 
wheelbarrow.




Gedi’s house in 
Mogadishu






block, possibly the 
United Nations
Yes Harakat Al Shebab Yes Abu bakr sidi 
hiray
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attack in Baidoa 
(unknown)
No None No Female arrested, 






Ethiopian Base in 
Baidoa













PIS base in 
Bosasso
Yes Not claimed but blessed 






UNDP Hargeisa Yes Not claimed but alleged 
by Somaliland to be 
Shebab, blessed by 









Yes Not claimed but alleged 
by Somaliland to be 
Shebab, blessed by 









Yes Not claimed but alleged 
by Somaliland to be 
Shebab, blessed by 










AU base in 
Mogadishu






AU base in 
Mogadishu





(GNU) base in 
Mogadishu 







Ministers in the 
new government
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Suicide attack on 
graduation 
sermony in Shamo 
Hotel, 
Mogadishu.Qamar 







Addow, the higher 
education 
minister, all died 
in the explosion




alleges that this is a 
government operation






A suicide attacker 
attacks a medical 
Clinique close to 
the airport and 
often used by 
African Union 
personnel . The 
attacker wore an  
explosive jacket
Yes Harakat Al Shebab No Not known
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Ismail Ali (Irro) at 
Hamdi Hotel Las 
Anod, in the 
contested Sool 
province
Alleged only by 
Somaliland officials. It is 








road bombs (two) 
against the convoy 












drove a truck 
filled with 
explosives toward 
a new AU 
peacekeeping 
base. Claimed to 
be a revenge for 
the killing of Al 
Qaeda leaders in 
Iraq.






Mohamed  Yusuf 
and Abdulaahi 
Yaasiin
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